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Gerald Korngold

,,
Residential developments often create a general scheme of restrictions, operate common facilities, and establish an owners association to enforce the restrictions and operate the common areas. Private governments
raise difficult public policy and legal issues. Private regimes should generally be enforced as they encourage
the efficient use ofland, allow choice in living arrangements, and foster participatory democracy. At the same
time, though, the restrictions can offend personal autonomy, create inefficiencies, and permit undue control
by past generations over present owners.
The law should therefore enforce homeowners association covenants that prevent harmful fallout on the
neighborhood, but they should not uphold the few covenants that offend the personal autonomy of the current
owner. Moreover, the law should require that community associations treat owners equally, employ fair procedures, and refrain from making irrational decisions.

0

ver the past thirty years, there has been a tre
mendous growth in private communities. In
these regimes, the owners are subject to a scheme
ofrestrictions on land use and owner behavior. The
restrictions are administered and enforced by an association of the owners, which also has the power to
set rules and regulations binding the properties.
These associations function as private governments,
and are not subject to the constitutional doctrine
and statutory rules that limit and shape the actions
of public government.
These private land use controls and pri-

vate governments bring important benefits by
promoting efficient land use, freedom of choice
in living arrangements, and democratic selfdetermination. They also, however, raise serious
questions about the rights of the individual and the
extent and nature of permissible regulation by the
community. Courts often must resolve disputes between owners and the community over the substance
of the restrictions and the decision-making process
of the homeowners association. This article will critique the conflicting policies and suggest how the
law should balance these competing interests.

Gerald Korngold is Dean and the Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Law at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. He teaches and writes in the areas of property and real estate law. His
books include Private Land Use Arrangements: Easements, Real Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes and
Real Estate Transactions (with P. Goldstein). He has published articles in the Texas, Wisconsin, California-Davis,
Fordham, and Nova law reviews and the Real Estate Law Journal. Professor Korngold is an adviser to the Restatement
(Third) of Property-Servitudes published by the American Law Institute.
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This inquiry can provide guidance to planners,
developers, and lawyers in creating enforceable restrictions and structuring viable homeowners associations. Private governments deserve the attention
of public-sector planners and policy makers for a
number of reasons. First, homeowners association
developments may have an impact on the larger
community outside of the development. For example,
owners who are paying assessments to the association for private services such as recreation and security may resist paying their fair share of the public
tax burden necessary to provide parks and police
protection for the larger community. A private government may in effect provide the means for owners to secede from the larger body politic, thus
hampering efforts to address general social problems. Moreover, homeowners associations are regulated by government through condominium ,
common interest ownership, and planned unit development legislation and through zoning and the
subdivision process. Through these vehicles, planners and public officials may be able to influence
the balance that is struck between the homeowners
association's interest and the individual rights of
the owners. Finally, private government and public
government may learn from the experience of the
other in dealing with conflicts between the will of
the majority and the wishes of the dissenter. Both
face similar issues, such as balancing architectural
controls with free expression, occupancy restrictions
with family privacy, and speedy remedial action by
the community with due process considerations .
Two recent items, from a long list, illustrate the
tension between owners and private governments.
The first example deals with a private subdivision
that barred the use of the houses by "more than one
family" (Feely v. Birenbaum 1977). Two unrelated
men purchased a home in the subdivision as co-owners. In an enforcement action brought by the
homeowners association, the court held that
the restriction was valid and that the term
"family" did not include persons unrelated by
blood or marriage. The court issued an order
barring the two owners from residing together
in the house. It is important to note that the case
involved removal of an owner, not a rental tenant,
from his home. One may wonder whether this case
reached a proper balance between, on one hand, the
values of the community and the majority, and, on
the other hand, the individual's property rights and
72

personal autonomy.
A second item involved a condominium
owner (a 51 year old professional woman and
grandmother) who was sent a notice from her
condominium association as follows: "Description of violation: resident seen parking in circular driveway kissing and doing bad things
for over one hour." The association threatened
to impose a fine if it happened again. The
notice was also posted publicly at the condommmm, employing public humiliation to
achieve compliance with rules and regulations.
The incident was covered in the local and national print and broadcast media. As things
turned out, the association had made a mistake, and the notice was meant for a 1 7 year
old woman and a 21 year old man who had
been "parking" that evening. For that mistake,
the condominium owner suffered public humiliation and damage to her reputation at
work; some of the nicer names she was called
included "hot lips," "marathon kisser," and
"the kissing bandit" (Dodson 1991; Lichtblau
1991; Willman 1991). Again, certain questions
emerge from this episode: Should associations
be regulating such matters? Does the behavior of the association in this case give us confidence in the exercise of discretion by private
governments and the process that they use?
Where was the notice, opportunity to be heard,
and neutral decision-mak ing that we require
as a legal matter from public government?
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Use of Private Land Controls
Historical Roots
Some historical background is necessary to assess the desirability of private land use controls. Private land use controls have long been
employed to allocate non-possesso ry rights in
the land of another. These interests have traditionally been referred to as "easements" and
"covenants." An easement usually gives a landowner an affirmative right in another person's property, such as the right to use a path or roadway. A
covenant typically imposes a restriction on the use
of a parcel of land, such as barring nonresidentia l
uses; the holder of a covenant, usually a neighbor,
thus has a veto power over the development of
another's land (Korngold 1990). Recently, scholars
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TABLE 1: Percentage of Community Associations Institute member associations
(by unit size) that offer seven of the most common amenities:
Number of Units or Homes
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Amenity
Pool
Playground
Park Area
Clubhouse
Tennis
Lake/Pond
Golf Course

~

51-150

151-350

351-500

501+

43%
15%
20%
12%

64%
27%
26%
37%

76%
37%
29%
56%

74%
42%
51%
61%

75%
47%
52%
60%

13%
13%
1%

31%
22%
2%

45%
30%
4%

52%
42%
4%

58%
42%
19%

50

Source: Community Associations Institute 1993, 20.
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have referred to easements and covenants collectively as "servitudes."
Private land use controls have long been recognized, with examples dating from Roman and early
English law. In the modern era, these rights have
become even more important. The industrial revolution brought a demand for railroad and canal
rights-of-way and for rights over neighboring lands
to exploit resources and to build efficient manufacturing operations. Perhaps as a direct result, restrictions became imperative to designate residential
areas as havens from the industrial and commercial world (French 1988).

Modem Applications

t

At the end of the twentieth century, private land
use arrangements play an even more important role.
Society faces a decreasing amount of usable land,
urban and suburban sprawl testing transportation
networks, increased interdependence of landowners
due to geographical proximity, and environmental
fallout due to poorly planned development of earlier times. 'I'hus, over recent years, there has been
an increased use of traditional easements, such as
rights-of-way, pipeline and utility easements, and
resource extraction rights. New easements have also
been developed to meet commercial, social, and technological advances. These include telecommunications easements; solar and wind easements to
prevent interruption of sources of alternative energy; conservation and historical easements that
prevent degradation of natural areas or architectural features; and beach access easements to allow
the public to reach the seashore. 1
Servitudes are also being used today in a com-

prehensive manner. Easements and covenants are
almost always used today in shopping centers and
office and industrial parks in order to restrict the
types of businesses, regulate the type and manner
of construction, grant rights of access and use, and
allocate expenses for commonly shared facilities
such as roads and utilities.

Community Associations
Importantly, there has been an increasing use of
private controls in the housing arena. Residential
developers often employ servitudes in tract and highrise developments to increase the desirability of the
housing units. Typically, the developer imposes restrictions on the use of the property and types of
construction and structures. Often the owners receive rights in common facilities serving the development, such as roads, utilities, and recreational
areas, with a covenant providing for the payment of
fees by the owners to operate the facilities. Table 1
describes the amenities provided by community associations that are members of the Community Associations Institute, a national, nonprofit
association.
Furthermore, an increasing number of
these developments create an association of the unit
owners. The association administers the servitudes
through decisions of the entire body or a subgroup,
and essentially functions as a private government
pursuant to authority granted by the servitudes. The
association usually operates, maintains, and sometimes owns the shared facilities. The association may
also be empowered to set rules and regulations, enforce violations (such as noise and pet rules), make
discretionary decisions and approvals (such as ar-
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Figure 1:
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chitectural plans), provide other services (such as
security and trash collection), and levy, collect, and
disburse dues from the owners to pay for these activities. These servitude regimes may be organized
as a tract development with a homeowners association, a condominium, or a cooperative; despite the
differences in legal form, the policy considerations
are the same, and legal results should be consistent. 2 Figure 1 illustrates the comparative numbers
of these three types of communal ownership.
The growth in owner associations has been noteworthy. In 1962, there were 500 associations (Community Associations Institute 1988, 7); in 1992,
estimates put the number at 150,000 (Community
Associations Institute 1993, 13). In 1970, only one
percent of US housing units were in owner associations; 1993 figures show that 32 million Americans
live in associations, equating to nearly one out of
eight people (Community Associations Institute
1993, 13). Table 2 describes the growth in housing
units in community associations.

Tensions in Community Associations
Despite this great growth in owners associations,
there are some warning signals that bear watching.
News items and court decisions have reported conflicts within associations; these can be broken into
certain rough categories:
Disputes between the community and the
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individual: Sometimes there is a conflict between
the majority's goals and the individual's autonomy.
Such disputes include association prohibitions of political signs and flags; the banning of outdoor
swingsets; the prohibition of Christmas lights, stars
of David, or a succah, a small, outdoor structure used
to observe the Jewish holiday of Succot; a battle between an association and an owner who was using
the community pool for baptisms; never ending disputes over approval of architectural designs and
construction materials; conflict over pet restrictions;
and the family-type restriction described earlier. 3
Governance problems within the community
association: In other situations the community association decision-making process breaks down and
something other than effective and fair, democratic
self government is taking place. One recent case illustrates some of the disorder that can result in private governance. In this case, at the meeting of the
owners of a New York City cooperative building, one
owner publicly threatened to kill another, a pregnant woman, over a dispute about governance of the
cooperative. As a further irony, when the threatened owner brought a suit against the threatener
claiming that the act amounted to an intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the court dismissed
the action. The court gave the surprising explanation that the threat was not "extreme and outrageous conduct, which so transcends the bounds of
decency as to be regarded as atrocious and intoler-
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able in a civilized society" (Owen v. Leventritt 1991,
26). While this is certainly a unique story with an
odd disposition of the legal claim, it does raise questions about the quality of discourse and governance
in community associations and the acceptable social norms in such situations.
Comprehensive challenges to the community association structure: In some situations,
the whole notion of private government is
questioned. Consider current developments in
Columbia, Maryland, which was founded over 27
years ago as a planned community and is currently
home to 80,000 people. The community association
there owns and operates the city's open space and
recreational areas. A group of dissident owners are
engaged in a petition drive seeking a referendum to
incorporate Columbia as a city and to end the private government of the association. The dissidents
claim that the Columbia Association is fiscally irresponsible and that it provides only "symbolic democracy," not "real democracy" (Sachs 1994a, 1994c). A
leader of this group stated that "there had to be a
way in which citizens have control over finances and
policies. That's the purpose-Jeffersonian democracy'' (Sachs 1994b). The defenders of the Columbia
Association reject the dissenters' view. They believe
that the association functions efficiently and openly,
and that a city government would be more expensive than the current association system. In their
view, the private association structure is essential
to achieve the Columbian vision of the good life.
In determining how the law should react to the
conflicts over servitudes and private residential governments, it must be recognized that courts, in deciding cases, choose between competing arguments
of the litigants. Sometimes these choices are mandated by a clear, binding precedent of a prior decision, on which people have relied in planning their
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actions. In other cases, though, the court is dealing
with a legal question that has not been previously
decided or that presents a new wrinkle. In the latter, the court must understand the public policies
inherent in the dispute and select a rule that will
best effectuate societal goals. Finding that public
policy is not always easy, but choosing among competing policy arguments is something that AngloAmerican common law decision-makers have done
from the time the first wise man stood under a tree
at the village green in medieval England and decided a dispute between two people over ownership
of a cow. It is thus imperative to understand the
policy considerations inherent in servitudes and
community association disputes.

Policies Favoring Servitudes
The enforcement of servitudes validates private consensual arrangements, based on choices made in the
marketplace. This enforcement is consistent with
the law's long-standing respect for "freedom of contract." There are several benefits from enforcement
of these private arrangements, and these policies
are reflected in various judicial decisions.

Efficiency
Servitudes permit the efficient allocation of limited
land resources. By using servitudes, people can buy
the specific rights in land that they want without
having to spend more than they wish. For example,
if A, the owner of Lot 1, wants to prevent the lot
next door (Lot 2), owned by B, from having a factory
built on it, A can buy a covenant from B, for, hypothetically, $20. If A could not buy a covenant, he
would have to spend $100, hypothetically, to purchase the entire property interest (i.e. fee simple
title) in Lot 2. That would be a waste of A's resources

TABLE 2: Number of Community Association Housing Units
1970

Total CA Units
Total Associations
Total Number of
Housing Units
CAs Percent of All Housing

1975

1990

701,000
10,000

2,031,439
20,000

11,638,921
130,000

63,445,192
1.11%

67,640,000
3.0%

102,263,678
11.38%

Source: Community Associations Institute 1993, 13.
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that could be better put to another use. In addition,
Lot 2 would be unavailable to another person who
would have been happy to buy it for nonindustrial
uses.
Moreover, community association servitudes bring extra efficiencies beyond traditional servitudes. Community association servitudes
provide common facilities (such as utilities and recreation areas) that individual owners could not afford. Developer costs can also be lowered due to
planned unit development (PUD) zoning, and the
developer can avoid the expenses necessary to meet
governmental dedication standards if common facilities are retained and administered by the community association (United States Advisory
Commission 1989, 4). These savings can be passed
on to the homeowners.
Judicial decisions recognize that people will not
enter into such efficiency-maximizing arrangements
if the law will not enforce them. As one court stated,
''Those individuals who have invested their life savings in a home, 'The American Dream,' are entitled
to protection under the law, including enforcement
of the covenant, which they relied on when investing in the area" (Kiernan v. Snowden 1953).

Moral Obligation
The law has also enforced private land use controls
on moral grounds, finding that people are morally
obligated to live up to their promises. It would not
be proper to allow a person to buy land for a reduced price because of the presence of a covenant
and then resell it for a higher price free of the covenant (Tulk v. Moxhay 1848). For example, one court
enforced an adults-only restriction in a condominium, barring the unit owners-a married
couple-from living there with their newborn
baby. The court stated: "All young couples
buying living units can foresee the possibility
of children and this restriction has not 'snuck' up
on them, for they well knew of it prior to purchase
or conception. The choice was theirs" 4 (Franklin v.
White Egret Condominium 1977).

Freedom of Choice
The courts also enforce covenants because they represent the voluntary choices of people. Servitudes
allow individuals to create an environment that they
believe will maximize their self-fulfillment. In an

76

era of diminishing resources and increasing pressures of daily life, it is important to allow people to
create their own home and community environments, as places ofrenewal. In exchange for happiness and peace of mind from the servitude regime,
the owners accept community restrictions and
power. One noncomplying owner should not be allowed to unilaterally destroy the free choice and
quality of life of the rest of the community. Thus,
one court recognized the role of the association to
"promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind
of the majority of the unit owners" (Hidden Harbour
Estates, Inc. v. Norman 1980).

•

•

•

Community Associations
Moreover, the law has recognized that there are
special benefits in having a system ofreciprocal servitudes administered and enforced by a community
association. Covenants are "reciprocal" when all lots
have the same restrictions on them, giving each
owner the same burdens and benefits. With reciprocal covenants, neighbors may be more willing to
compromise when there are conflicts or questions
about covenant enforcement because of the social
norms favoring neighborly cooperation. Also, there
is self-interest-an owner may compromise on an
enforcement question today since in the future the
owner herself may seek an accommodation from her
neighbor.
Furthermore, flexibility is increased if the
covenants can be amended or modified by the
consent of less than 100 percent of the owners. Holdouts are thus prevented, and the community can achieve necessary change without
making ''blackmail payments." An association can
also be given, in the original documents creating the
development, the right to exercise discretion. This
is beneficial since some issues cannot be determined
at the time the community is created, such as the
amount of dues necessary to run the common facilities ten years into the development.
Moreover, the association structure permits
democratic self-determination. The owners are empowered to participate in the decisions affecting local land policy and to vote on community directions.
One commentator observed about public land use
regulation: ''Local governments are the last direct
contact that the average citizen has with the idea of
government; it is the only place where the citizen

•
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still feels that his individual participation might
make a difference" (Krasnowiecki 1980, 722).
These words resonate loudly in light of current
thoughts about devolution of governmental control,
which tend to advocate a transfer of political power
from larger entities to local groups. Moreover, there
are echoes of the message of the communitarians,
with their focus on an increased sense of community and individual responsibility.

Problems with Servitudes
~

•

Although there are great benefits from servitudes
and community associations, these must be balanced
against the costs. There are two problem areas: the
first involves the permissible subject matter of servitudes, and the second concerns the behavior and
functioning of private residential governments.

Subject Matter
•

•·
•

+
•

t

•

•
.,
•

There are concerns about some types ofrestrictions.
While, as described earlier, some courts have stated
the benefits of servitude arrangements, other courts
have taken a contrary view. 5 This contrary view
maintains that the law favors the free and unrestricted use of land and is suspicious of land use
restrictions. A covenant is a perpetual restriction.
Unless specifically limited by the parties at the time
of creation, a covenant will remain attached to the
land forever. It will bind not only the original purchaser of the burdened property, but all subsequent
owners as well. This could be a problem. Current or
future owners cannot change the use of the land to
meet the needs of society as reflected in the marketplace if such changes would result in violation of
the covenant; thus, efficient use oflimited land supply may be frustrated. 6 One court addressed this
concern when it stated: "This court has serious reservations about the wisdom of allowing provisions
contained in a 1949 real estate transaction ... to prevent the development of a substantial piece of real
estate in 1978" (In re Turners Crossroad Development Co. 1979).
The age old battle of the generations is also a
relevant concern. Judicial enforcement of a perpetual covenant created in the past achieves the
vision of a previous generation, which may thwart
the aspirations and personal autonomy of the current owner. Also, we must take care that in enforcing servitudes to achieve communal goals, we do not
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intrude into the family home, which we have long
valued as a private refuge from the larger world. 7
Therefore, the law must balance the costs and
benefits of servitudes. I would support the enforcement of a restriction only to the extent that it regulates an owner's external behavior rather than her
status or private conduct. Courts should thus uphold restrictions that control harmful spillovers on
the community that arise from an owner's use of
her property (such as noise or traffic). Courts should
not, however, enforce controls on personal choices
within a home. Returning to the earlier example of
the two male co-owners, a court should not enforce
the covenant to bar them, as they create no greater
noise, traffic, or other fallout on the neighborhood
as compared to a "traditional" family. Some courts
have recognized this distinction where neighbors
attempted to bar group homes for the physically
challenged or emotionally disturbed. In one such
decision, the court noted that "from the outside, the
home looks like all other single family homes"
(Costley v. Caromin House, Inc. 1981). This distinction needs to be adopted by other courts and applied in other situations.
Under my test, covenants would be enforceable in most every situation. For example,
aesthetic and architectural covenants would
be valid, as they control harmful spillovers
that can harm property values and visual
ambiance. If a person does not want to be so
restricted, then he can simply choose not to
buy in the community. Or if he did buy and
now does not like the servitudes, then he can
sell and move out. But he should not be permitted to stay and devalue the scheme for the
rest of the owners. Only in the unusual case
where personal autonomy is threatened
should the court refuse enforcement.
There is an important reason why courts should
act when servitudes threaten personal autonomy.
America has the terrible history of restrictive covenants, once common in this country, that barred
occupancy by African Americans, other nonwhites,
and religious minorities (Marsh 1990, 168-170). The
market mechanism was an insufficient response to
this assault on personhood---on the contrary, the
market demanded these covenants. In such cases,
the law must deny enforcement to the private arrangement and enlightened public policy must prevail.8
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Regulations on the exhibition ofreligious objects
and political signs raise complicated issues that are
not easily resolved. While these restrictions control
aesthetic intrusions, which we normally allow the
community to control, they also limit religious and
political expression and practice. It should be noted
that public regulations-not just private controlsoften restrict religious and political expression in
similar ways.

Association Governance
The second problem with servitude schemes relates
to the behavior and functioning of community associations. As discussed earlier, community associations are private governments, and therefore not
subject to the constitutional limitations and statutory controls that apply to public government decisions and methods of operation. So the question is
whether private governments should be policed by
the law and, if so, to what extent.

Unequal treatment:
A community association might give unequal treatment to similarly situated owners. For example,
assume that an association, in response to the
community's desire for additional recreation areas,
locates a playground next to a particular owner's
house, making her the only person in the community who has to bear the noise, litter, and other undesirable behavior that may arise from the
playground. 9
Unequal treatment in the community association context is a concern for various reasons. Private communities will be jeopardized
if homeowner rights can be summarily rearranged by a tyrannical majority. Moreover,
people have come to expect fair dealing in
both commercial activities and in public life, and
they similarly expect equal treatment in the community association context.
The courts have begun to address unequal
treatment. Some decisions have reversed association actions that result in unacceptable inequality
of treatment. Courts have required association decisions to be consistent with the general plan of development and the way in which other residents
have been treated in similar situations (Ridge Park
Home Owners v. Pena 1975).
One recent case illustrates this growing attitude
(Jaskiewicz v. Walton 1988). The covenants govern-
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ing the development barred subdivision of any of
the lots. The servitudes also permitted amendment
of the covenants by a majority of the owners. One
owner wanted to subdivide his lot along the line of a
ravine that bisected his lot. Twenty-three of fortyfive owners agreed to the amendment of the covenants to permit this one subdivision. The validity
of the amendment was challenged by some of the
dissenting owners. The amendment on its face
seemed to be a reasonable decision since the lot was
already physically divided, the owner could not build
a single home across both portions, and amendment
by a majority of owners was expressly permitted by
the governing documents. Balanced against this,
however, was the view that amendments to the covenants should be applied uniformly to all lots, and
that no special deals should be allowed because of
the general expectation of equal treatment. Moreover, if ad hoc amendments were possible, one could
imagine a scenario where fifty-one percent of the
owners could amend the covenants to release their
lots from the burden of the restrictions while maintaining the covenants on the remaining forty-nine
percent. That would be an unacceptable rewriting
of the initial bargain upon which all buyers relied.
The scheme would be destroyed, eroding the expectations of buyers and making servitude communities less attractive. The court in this case rejected
the unequal treatment and held that the amendment was invalid.
A related question is whether the association decision-making body exercises its discretion in a fair manner. One especially difficult area
involves architectural regulations, since it is difficult to articulate specific standards. In a recent case,
the underlying documents required that building
plans be approved by an architectural control committee of association members prior to building
(Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates 1988). The covenant did not provide any standards. An owner submitted plans for a geodesic dome, and the committee
rejected them. From the owner's perspective, the absence of standards makes it difficult for an owner to
predict how his vision will be treated before he invests in a lot in the subdivision. Moreover, without
standards, there is a concern that the decision is
merely. a random event, stifling our social norm of
free expression. Yet the court, in similar cases, upheld the decision of the board. Because it is so difficult to put aesthetic principles into words, and since
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there is no universal agreement as to those principles, the board's decision should be upheld as long
as it is consistent with the neighborhoo d scheme and
other board decisions in similar situations. Given
the clash between the traditional roof lines of the
other homes and the geodesic dome, the board's decision was legally permissible .

Procedural fairness:
Owners also have a right to expect fair procedures
in association decision making. Courts have imposed
requiremen ts of notice and an opportunity to be
heard before the association can take action
(Hanchett v. East Sunnyside Civic League 1985).
Courts have also held that decisions must be made
in good faith and that impermissi ble biases will not
be tolerated. The harm to the woman who received
the "kissing'' notice from her condominiu m could
have been averted if she had an opportunity to be
heard before the association made its summary (and
incorrect) judgment and imposed its humiliating
punishmen t.
Irrational decisions:
Some owners may dissent from the wisdom of a particular decision of the association, such as parking
rules, pet regulations , and recreationa l area rules.
Still, the courts should generally defer to the decision of the association. A court should not substitute its own determinati on of the costs and benefits
of a proposed course of action for the judgment of
the association. Deference to the association' s choice
is proper since the association has greater expertise and knowledge of the issues, and the decisions
of the community arrived at through the democratic
process should be respected.
However, there is one type of situation, that does
not often occur, where the court should strike down
an association decision. This is when the association makes a decision that reduces the community 's
welfare by imposing burdens on owners but the decision does not provide any offsetting benefits. We
might describe the association decision in such a
case as "irrational."
For example, one case involved a community that banned satellite dishes on the theory that
they were an aesthetic blight (Portola Hills Community Ass'n v. James 1992). In my view, the court
correctly permitted an owner to keep his satellite
dish, despite the regulation, since the layout of the
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owner's house and his landscaping made it absolutely impossible for anyone else to see the satellite
dish. Upholding the prohibition against this owner
would only impose a burden without bringing any
correspondi ng aesthetic benefit to the community. 10
Similarly, another case dealt with a rule that
permitted only cars to be parked in carports. The
court held that the rule could not be applied to prevent an owner from parking a noncommercial pickup
truck that was used only for the owner's transportation to and from work. The regulation was petty
and pointless, but very intrusive. The appellate court
stated:
Beauty--eve n with cars-is in the eye of the beholder. In this world where those persons concerned with upwardly mobile status frequently
drive off-road vehicles including well-appoint ed
jeeps or pickup trucks, we think the trial court's
ruling is eminently sensible. The pickup truck,
often both comfortable and economical, has become for many the equivalent of the convertible
in earlier years. As times change, cultural perceptions-inc luding society's acceptance of certain types of vehicles-als o change. The pickup
truck no longer has a pejorative connotation. One
person's Bronco II is another's Rolls-Royce
(Bernardo Villas Managemen t Corp. Number
Two v. Black 1987). 11

Some people feel that judicial interventio n is
unnecessar y in such cases. They argue that the community could simply change the rule if the community agreed that the rule was irrational (Gillette
1994). This is not convincing, however, since there
are structural and practical problems that prevent
the community from addressing all irrational situations. Inertia and the disinterest of the majority in
the problems of the few are, unfortunate ly, powerful forces that often prevent a response by the community. There needs to be some recourse in the case
of wholly irrational regulation.

Conclusi on
Private land use controls and community associations bring great benefits and should be respected
in virtually all situations. In some special cases,
though, the public interest requires that the private
agreement should not be enforced. Although the
exact dividing line may not always be clear, courts
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can reach the best results if they base their decisions on a considera tion of the underlyin g policies
discussed in this article. The law has always been,
and always should be, evolving, as it responds to
new developm ents in society and emerging policy
concerns. As land policy is rethought and redefined
to meet the challenge s of the future, the law must
provide a means to implemen t society's vision of how
we should utilize our precious and limited land resources.

NOTES
1. For further description s of these devices: Nollan v. California Coastal Commissio n 1987; Degan 1973; Centel
Cable Television v. Cook 1991; Korngold 1990.
2. Different legal devices may be used to create a servitude regime and private governme nt-a developme nt may
be organized as a condomini um, with a condomini um association and the board as a subgroup; or as a tract or
townhouse development, with a governing body called a
homeowners or property owners association ; or as a cooperative, usually organized as a corporatio n with a board
of directors. Despite different legal forms, the policy considerations are the same; and since good legal analysis
does not favor form over substance, the technical differences in structure should not yield different results. These
various legal devices are described in Natelson 1989. The
figures from 1990 indicate that of the total association s
42% were in condomini ums, 7% were in cooperativ es, and
51% were in planned community homeowne rs associations. Communit y Associatio ns Institute 1993, 13.
3. For documenta tion of these events see Linn Valley Lakes
Property Ass'n v. Brockway 1992 (sign); Gerber v. Longboat
Harbor North Condomin ium, Inc. 1989 (flag); Earnest
1991 (swingsets ); Brooks 1988 (holiday decoration s);
Higgins 1990 (succah); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n 1994 (pet restriction ).
4. Discrimin ation against sales of homes to families with children in now unlawful under the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, unless exempt housing for older persons is involved. See Massaro
v. Mainlands Civic Ass'n, 3 F.3d 1472 (11th Cir. 1993).
5. For example, Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1986).
6. In Ervin v. Deloney Construction, Inc., 596 So. 2d 593
(Ala. 1992) the court used its power to interpret a covenant to avoid a restriction that would greatly reduce the
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land's developme nt. The court held that a small encroachment of a swimming pool on a neighbor's lot was not a
"structure" that would bar neighbor from building a house
on the property since that would render the neighbor's
lot useless.
7. See Gordon 1978, 66-68 and Clark 1986, xi-xvi,
discussing American family home as place of refuge.
8. Racial covenants were voided by an expansive use of
state action doctrine on constitutio nal grounds. See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9. See Killearn Lakes Homeowners Ass'n v. Sneller, 418
So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
10. See Brock v. Strole, 63 Ohio App. 3d 96, 577 N.E.2d
1168 (1989) (undergrou nd culvert not an impermiss ible
"structure" ).
11. See also Justice Court Mutual Housing Cooperative,
Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1966)
(rule limiting the playing of musical instrumen ts by any
individual to one and one-half hours a day was drawn too
roughly to address legitimate noise problems and merely
put a burden on the owners).
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